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No. 8483

In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah

N. J. MEAGHER, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
EQUITY OIL CoMPANY, a corporation, et al.,
Defenda;nts.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO THE ANSWERING BRIEF
FILED BY WEBER OIL COMPANY.

1.

INTRODUCTION.

A. Before replying to the Weber Brief, we desire to
define .a few phrases which will be used herein.
(1) Mention will be made of the "Dunford Decree,"
by which we mean the decree entered by Judge Dunford
upon the second trial of the quiet title suit. The so-called
"Dunford Decree" was affirmed by this Court. The Dunford Decree is set forth as Appendix B in the Meagher
Opening Brief. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Law, upon which the Dunford Decree is based, are set
forth as Appendix A thereof. The opinion of this Court
affirming the Dunford Decree is Appendix ·C.
(2) When interests in the lease are referred to, we
are speaking of the lessee's rights, as to oil, under the
lease. As used herein, the terms "lessee's rights" and
''interest in the lease'' refer to what are sometimes called
"working interests" or" operating rights." Since the owners of royalties ~IEt entitled to 18¥2% of the production,
it follows that ~%of the production is available for
the owners of the working interests. Thus when we say
that Meagher acquired the former Stock Half of the

'-./~ lease from Stock, we mean, ~ims of production, that
Meagher is entitled to lf2 of
i.e., 40.75% of production. Similarly, when we refer to the Phebus Half
of the lease we are speaking of the right of its owners
to 40.75% of production. Doubtless this Court understands our meaning in using these terms, but due to the
remarkable arithmetical presentation contained in the
Weber Brief, we wish to define these terms.

y

%,

B. Turning to the affirmative argun1ents presented
by Weber, it is revealing to note that the heart of the
Weber argmnent is the pren1ise that under the Dunford
Decree, as affir1ned by this Court, the ~Ieaghers were not
awarded one-half of the lease but only obtained onequarter. They argue that the Dunford Decree did not
award the entire former Stock Half of the le-ase to the
Meaghers, but only one-half of the former -Stock Half. In
terms of production, they argue that the Meaghers did not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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become entitled to 40.75·% of p-roduction, but only % of
40.75%. They argue that Stock and Juhan were awarded
the other half of the former Stock Half. Then they urge
that since, by the Dunford Decree, the 'Meaghers got half
of the Stock Half, and Stock and Juhan got one-quarter
of the whole, the remaining half of the entire lease, i.e.,
the Phebus Half, belongs to Weber.
This entire argument rests upon W Hber 's construction
of the Dunford Decree. Thus the fundamental issue is,
what did the Dunford Decree award to the Meaghers ~ The
Meaghers contend the Dunford Decree and the decision of
this Court affirming it make it crystal clear that Stock
transferred everything he had to Meagher. Since Stock's
interest at the time of his transfer to Meagher is conceded
by all and was held by this Court to have been one-half of
the lease, we submit that there is no basis whatsoever to
support the Weber contention. Once this point is deterInined, Weber's argument is revealed as a mere effort to
create arithmetical confusion in the hope of salvaging
something from a lost cause.

2.

CONCERNING WEBER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.

A. In the second paragraph of Weber's Brief, the
following sentence appears:
"Weber Oil Company admittedly owns the Phebus
Half.''

The same assumption is made throughout the Brief. It is
not a fact. Perhaps Stock and Juhan admit that Weber
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
owns half of the working interest. But the Meaghers do
not. It is true that the Meaghers admit they do not
claim an interest in the Phebus Half. However, to the
extent the total claims of all defendants exceed one-half
of the lease, the Meaghers do and consistently have resisted
such claims. Although the Meaghers do not claim to own
the Phebus Half, they certainly do claim to own all of
the former Stock Half. They are indifferent with respect
to the ownership of the Phebus Half. This is a far cry
from an admission by the Meaghers that Weber owns
the Phebus Half.
B. Weber's statement of facts (p. 3) states:
''There is no appeal or cross appeal taken from the
ruling dated October 14, 1955. ''
This is misleading. The ruling of October 14, 1955
was nothing but a memorandum decision filed by the trial
judge after considering the arguments and briefs of the
parties with respect to the motions for summary judgment. Mter the ruling of October 14th, the !!eaghers
and Weber filed proposed forn1s of decree to formalize
the ruling. This procedure has been consistently followed
throughout the 12 years of tl1is litigation. In nearly every
instance, after a ruling "~as announced by the court, the
parties have proposed an order or decree to formally
finalize it. The san1e procedure 'Yas adopted here after
the ruling of October 14th. The fact that the forn1al
Interlocutory Judgn1ent and Decree, based on that ruling,
was not entered until Decen1ber 13, 1955, is merely because none of the parties 'vere satisfied 'vi th the proposed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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decree submitted by the others. Each filed written objections to the proposals of its adversaries, and it took from
October 14th to December 13th to settle the form of the
decree.
C. Weber's statement of facts (p. 5) states:
"The court in its rulings on motions dated October 14,
1955 (R. 213-215 at page 214) concludes that Equity
Oil Company appears only as a 'stakeholder.' "
If Weber means that the lower court has determined
that Equity appears in the case ·only as a stakeholder, we
must dispute Weber's effort to gain something for its
parent -company. It is the Meagher position that while
the lower court has recognized that Equity asserts that
it is only a stakeholder, there has been no ruling by the
lower court that such is the ultimate and final status
of Equity.
As stated above, we have asked this Court to modify
the Interlocutory Decree hy ruling that Equity is a real
party in interest and a principal with respect to the
activities of the defendants and is not limited in its status
to that of mere stakeholder. Alternatively, if this Court
deems the issue to be ~beyond the scope of this appeal, we
have asked it to so declare in such manner as will not
preclude plaintiffs from raising the issue in the course
of the further proceedings below.
D. The Weber Brief correctly states that a quitclaim
deed from the Senior Meaghers to their children, dated
May 10, 1954, was given shortly before this action was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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commenced. However, it should also be noted that under
a prior quitclaim deed the Senior Meaghers transferred
the same interest to their children on January 27, 1948
(Exhibit A-22 in District Court No. 2238). The second
quitclaim merely confirms the former. Thus the fact is
that the transfer to the Meagher children goes back to
1948.

3.

CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 1, NAMELY, THAT ''WEBER
OIL COMPANY SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT OF THE ACTION WITH A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOR AS TO
THE TITLE THAT IT AD:MITTEDLY OWNS."

A. First, we note that no argument at all is presented
for dismissing Weber out of the action. Weber is one
of the owners of the lease. Through its agent Equity, it
has operated the property. Weber's basic obligation to
account to the Meaghers has been recognized by the decree
against Weber's agent, but there has been no attempt at
this stage of the litigation to finally and precisely adjud~
icate Weber's ultimate obligations. Thus there is no
reason whatsoever to ·dismiss \\:eber ··out of the action.''
B. Second, contrary to \Y-eber's assertion, the Interlocutory Decree does recognize that '"\'Y-eber is entitled to an interest in the lease. It recites that Stock
transferred his half to ~Ieagher; then it recites that
Juhan acquired the Phebus Half; then it recites that
the various defendants (Juhan, Stock, Equity and Weber)
have made transfers of the Phebus Half bet,Yeen thenlselves; then it reeites that those transfers are valid
against the Meaghers so far as they rela·te to the Phebus
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Half only. Finally, in the order which follows these
recitals, the Interlocutory Decree adjudicates (1) that the
Meaghers own half of the lease, and (2) that the defendants (including Weber) own the other half of the lease.
Thus the Interlocutory Decree does grant Weber's
motion for summary judgment with respect to Weber's
interest in the lease to the extent that Weber has an
interest.
C. The argument under Weber's Point 1 goes beyond
the above two matters. It asserts that Weber ''admittedly'' owns half of the lease. This is not true. But on
this false assertion the Weber argument proceeds on the
theory that Weber should now be awarded a one-half
interest in the lease. Since the Dunford Decree awarded
Stock and Juhan a one-quarter interest, the purpose of
the Weber contention is to reduce the Meagher interest
from one-half to a quarter.
In subdivision A of ·Section 2 of this brief, we have
noted that regardless of what the defendants may ''admit''
between themselves, the Meaghers certainly do not and
never have admitted that Weber owns one-half of the
lease. The Meaghers do admit that they claim no interest
in the Phebus Half. But the Meaghers do not admit
that Weber owns it. Of course, such an admission, even
if made, would give Weber no title. From the fact that
the Meaghers assert no interest in the Phebus Half, it
does not follow that they .concede that Weber owns it.
D. This section of the Weber Brief seeks to charge
the Meaghers with some default for failure to appeal from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that portion of the Dunford Decree which awards onequarter of the lease to Stock and Juhan. But whether
the Dunford Decree does or does not correctly delineate
the quantum of the Stock-Juhan interest in the Phebus
half is of no concern to the Meaghers for the reasons
stated above. The importance of the Dunford Decree to
the Meaghers lies in its clear award of a one-half interest
in the entire lease to the ~1eaghers.
E. The Weber Brief also seeks to reach its astounding
arithmetical non sequitur by urging that only the Stock
Half of the lease was involved in the Dunford quiet title
suit. The argument suggests that if only the Stock Half
was involved in that suit the award of one-half to the
Meaghers would be one-half of the Stock Half, and so, onequarter of the whole. The answer to this is that the
entire Sheridan Lease was the subject matter of the quiet
title suit.
Juhan himself brought the lease into that litigation
by his Answer. This pleading sets up the entire lease,
claims ownership of all of it, and prays adjudication
accordingly. The entire lease "~as before the court. The
Meaghers clailned only the half they obtained from Stock.
Juhan and the parties he represented clain1ed the entire
lease. Juhan and Stock failed in their efforts to wrest the
Stock Half from the ~leaghers. No"~ they argue that only
the Stock 1-Ialf 'v-as in litigation.
The fallaey of Weber's premise is disclosed by the
Dunford Decree and the decision of this Court affirming
it. The Dunford Decree in a"~arding half of the lease
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to Meagher and one-quarter to Stock and Juhan, certainly
could not have done so unless more than the Stock Half
was before the court.
For Weber to now seek an award of one-half of the
lease is to defy the Dunford Decree unless Weber proves
that it obtained an additional interest, either from Stock
or Juhan, or from the Meaghers. There is neither proof
nor contention that Weber ever obtained any interest
through the Meaghers. Thus whatever Weber has must
have come from ~Stock or Juhan. It is therefore necessarily limited to a share in the Phebus. Half.
1

Nothing would please the defendants more than a series
of judicial decrees which would award 50% to Meagher,
25:% to Stock and Juhan and 50% to Weber (a total of
125%). With such -confusion they ·well might exhaust
the oil before the Meaghers could clarify the mess. We
are confident that this Court will not be misled into such
an ''overissue.''
F. Since the complete answer to Weber's Point 1 is
contained in the Dunford Decree and the decision of this
Court affirming it, we shall set forth a few of the pertinent clauses from the Dunford Findings, Conclusions and
Decree and from this Court's Opinion (emphasis added):

Findings:
'' 35. On October 21, 1944, by document A30, defendant Stock transferred to plaintiff Meagher all of
his right, title and interest in the lease as modified,
by which transfer 'Meagher .acquired an undivided
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one half interest in the lessee's rights with respect
to oil in the 440 acre parcel.''
0 onclusions:
''B. With respect to the 440-acre parcel : . . .
'' 4. Meagher owns an undivided one-half interest
in the lessee's rights with respect to oil under the
lease Al as modified. . . .
"5. Defendant Juhan and assigns, whose respective interests are hereafter set forth, own all of the
said lessee's rights with respect to gas and an undivided one-half of the said lessee's rights with
respect to oil. . . .
''12. The aforesaid interests of Juhan and his
assigns in said lessee's rights referred to in Conclusion B5 above are owned as follows: ...
'' (b) Juhan owns an undivided three-sixteenths
with respect to oil. . . .
''(d) Stock owns an undivided one-sixteenth
with respect to oil. . . .
"(f) Weber Oil ~Company owns an undivided
one-fourth with respect to oil.
'' 13. The cone1usions herein are not res judicata
with resp·ect to Weber Oil Company, but transfers
to it .are noted to delineate interests owned by those
who are parties to this action. . . . ''
Decree:
"2. Plaintiff, N. J. ~Ieagher, is the owner of all
rights, titles and interests in and to that certain
real p-roperty ...
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Subject to : . . .
'' (3) An oil and gas lease dated June 4, 1924, .. .
as modified by an agreement dated May 21, 1927, .. .
'' 4. The interests of the parties hereto in and to
the aforesaid oil and gas lease are decreed to be as
follows:
"Plaintiff N. J. Meagher owns an undivided onehalf interest in the lessee's rights with respect to oil.
''Defendant Joe T. Juhan owns ... an undivided
three-sixteenths interest in the lessee's rights with
respect to oil.
"Defendant Paul Stock owns ... an undivided onesixteenth interest in the lessee's rights with respect
to oil.''
Supreme Court Opinion:
'' [1] Since our former decision, three claims were
allowed to be brought into the case: ... 2) Stock's,
by counterclaim, to assert a one-half interest in operating rights in 440 acres, in opposition to Meagher's
identical claim; and 3) Meagher's, by amended reply,
to claim ownership of such interest by transfer from
Stock. Working rights in the 440 spring from a 1924
oil and gas lease, modified in 1927. By mesne conveyance, Stock and Phebus each became owner of a
half interest therein. Meagher claims nothing through
Phebus, but claims a one-half interest through Stock's
'release', principal subject of this suit . . .
''The lower court, on the evidence, held this instrument transferred Stock's interest to Meagher. We
affirm such holding.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The entire structure of the Weber Brief is predicated
upon the p.remise that the Dunford Decree and its affirmance did not award Stock's interest to Meagher but only
awarded him one-half thereof. We submit that this construction of the Dunford Decree is so fantastic that it is
frivolous.

4.

CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 2, NAMELY, THAT "THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DECEMBER 13,
1955, IS VOID AS TO WEBER OIL COMPANY."

In arguing this point Weber contends that the ruling
of October 14, 1955 constituted a final judgment. The
argument continues that time for appeal commenced on
October 14th and not on December 13th, which is the date
the Interlocutory Judgment and Decree was entered to
formalize said ruling.
A. The Weber argument refers to Rule 56 which sets
forth summary judgment procedure. The V\7" eber Brief
says:
''No findings are required and the judgment so
entered is final, except as provided in subdivision (d)
of the rule. ''
How can it be said that dno findings are required"
when the express instructions of the court contained in
Rule 56 (d) directs the court to specify the facts which
appear without substantial controversy~~ The ruling of
.,, l n discussing the court's duty under Rule 56 (d), \,. ol. 6

Moore's Federal Practice at p. 2306 states that this rule puts a
co1npulsory duty upon the trial court to enter an order specifying
the facts which appear \vithout substantial controversy.
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October 14th does not purport to set forth such facts. It
merely announces the conclusions of the trial judge as
does any memorandum of decision. Thereafter, if it is
a case which requires recitals or findings or other formalization, it is established practice for the parties to present
the documents they propose for this purpose. If the
Meaghers had not done so, we would now be confronted
with a proper contention by Weber that the ruling is
defective because it does not specify the facts which
appear without substantial controversy. The specification
of .such facts in a summary proceeding is tantamount
to the findings of fact in an ordinary proceeding. Until
these specifications are set forth, the appellate court is
without means of determining whether summary proceedings were proper. The very concept of summary proceedings is that the conclusions made therein are based
upon uncontroverted facts, and for that reason can he
summarily made.
B. There is substantial authority to guide the Court
in determining whether a particular judicial pronouncement constitutes a judgment or a mere memorandum of
decision which will be formally finalized at a later time.
The rule is that the Court's prevailing practice is determinative of this question.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bedford
(1945) 325 U.S. 283, 89 L.Ed. 1611;
In re Forstner Chain Corporation (C.A.lst 1949)
177 F.2d 572;
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Peoples Book v. Fed. Reserve Bank of San FraJY~r.
cisco ( C.A.9th 1945) 149 F.2d 850;
Wright v. Gibson, et al. (C.A.9th 1942) 128 F.2d
865.
In the Forstner case, supra, the court said:
"An opinion is not itself a judgment, even though
it contains conclusions of fact or of law, and foreshadows how the judge intends to dispose of the case.
Not infrequently, however, there is tacked on at the
end of an opinion a sentence in mandatory language
such as : 'The complaint is dismissed.' In the understanding and practice of the particular court, this
concluding sentence may ;be the final judgment, the
concluding judicial act or pronouncement disposing of
the case, to be entered by the clerk forthwith. But not
necessarily so. * * * If it is the practice of the court
to pronounce judgment in a more formal manner, in
a separate document entitled 'Judgment,' then the
concluding sentence at the end of the opinion amounts
to no more than a direction to the clerk for the
preparation of the final judgn1ent on behalf of the
court; the forn1al judgment
then be signed or
initialed by the judge or issued in the name of the
court under the attestation of the clerk (whatever is
the local practice), and not lmtil then will the clerk
make the entry of the judgment in the civil docket in
accordance with Rule 79(a)."

''ill

In the above case the c.ourt concluded that the prevailing
practice of the court did not conten1plate entry of a more
formal document. However, in the Bedford case, supra,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that a ruling
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of the Second Circuit which concluded with the phrase
"The order of the Tax Court is reversed" did not constitute a judgment, since the prevailing practice of the
Second Circuit was to finalize such rulings in formal
documents. The Supreme Court stated:
''The Rules would have to be far less artistic than
they are to warrant us in holding that the Circuit
Court of Appeals has consistently misinterpreted some
of its own Rules. Whether the announcement of an
opinion and its entry in the docket amounts to a judgment for purposes of appeal or whether that must
await some later formal act, ought not to be decided
on nice-spun argumentation in disregard of the judicial habits of the court whose judgment is called into
question, of the bar practicing before it, of the clerk
who embodies its procedural traditions, as well as in
conflict with the assumption of the reviewing court.''
Thus to determine whether the October 14th ruling constitutes a judgment, the p-revailing practice of the court
and of the bar must be examined.

In the instant case the practice 1s clear. The record
discloses that throughout the many years of this litigation
substantially all of the rulings rendered by the trial judge
have been subsequently finalized by formal order proposed
by one or both of the parties. This has been done on at
least two occasions by Weber itself. We refer to a ruling
of Judge Tuckett following the hearing on Meaghers'
request for a temporary injunction, and also to another
ruling of Judge Tuckett with respect to a motion to dismiss various portions of the complaint. In the latter
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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instance, the Judge's memorandum of ·decision was also
entitled "Rulings on Motions" and was dated December
15, 1954. The formal order finalizing the ruling was presented by Mr. Gustin, as counsel for Weber and Equity,
and was signed on December 21, 1954. In the case of
the ruling on the motion for temporary injunction, Judge
Tuckett prepared and filed a minute entry .setting forth
a memorandum of his decision on May 20, 1954. It was
not until September 23, 1954 that the order proposed
by Mr. Gustin, formally finalizing this pronouncement of
the court, was entered.
With respect to the October 14, 1955 ruling, it is obvious
that Weber must have viewed it as a mere memorandum
because it presented its form of judgment with respect
to the matter after the ruling was entered.
Examination of the correspondence between Judge
Tuckett and counsel immediately after the ruling of
October 14th was entered proves beyond any question that
everyone recognized the practice of formalizing rulings.
This correspondence begins with the follo·wing letter from
plain tiffs ' counsel to Judge Tuckett (a copy of this letter
was sent to each counsel for defendants) :
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October 20, 1955.
''The Honorable R. L. Tuckett
Judge of the District Court
Vernal, Utah
Meagher v. Equity
No. 3228-Civil
Dear Judge Tuckett:
It goes without saying that we were pleased to
receive a copy of your decision expressed In the
'Ruling on Motions' dated October 14th.
We are preparing and will .shortly submit to you
formal documents to finalize the decision.*
Yours very truly,
H. VanDam
Gilbert ~c. Wheat''
Then, on October 22, 19·55, Mr. Gustin wrote the following letter to all counsel of record (a copy was sent
to Judge Tuckett) :
"Mr. Herbert Van Dam
Octoher 22, 1955
Mr. Gilbert C. Wheat
Mr. Burton W. Musser
Mr. Richard Downing
Mr. Oliver W. Steadman
Re: Meagher et al. v.
Equity Oil Company et al.
Gentlemen:
We have this day handed to Judge Tuckett a form
of judgment of which the enclosure is a copy. Judge
Tuckett has requested us to inform all counsel that

•Emphasis added.
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objections to the enclosure should be made within ten
days from the date hereof.*
Very truly yours,
Gustin, Richards & Mattsson
ByHarleyW. Gustin''

Three days later, counsel for plaintiffs wrote the following letter to Judge Tuckett (a copy of this letter and
of the proposed decree mentioned therein was sent to each
of the counsel for the defendants) :
'' Hon. R. L. Tuckett
October 25, 1955
District Court Judge
Provo, Utah
Re : Meagher et al v.
Equity Oil Company et al
Dear Judge Tuckett:
We enclose original and copy of form of interlocutory judgment 'vhich "~e deem appropriate in this
case. We assume you will file the original with the
court Clerk, and keep a copy for your personal use.
With Mr. Gustin's letter of October 22, 1955, carbon
copy of which was sent to you, we received copies
of the form of judgment left with you on that date
by him, and 've noted your request that objections
to the proposed judgment be made within ten days
from the date of the letter. \\Te shall file our objections within the tiine stated.
And may ",.e suggest that counsel for defendants
be allowed ten days fron1 this date to file objections
to our proposed for1n of judgn1ent, and that your
•Emphasis added.
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Honor set a date for hearing· at which the form of
judgment can be settled.*
Very truly yours,
Gilbert C. Wheat
Herbert Van Dam''
Thereafter written objections to all proposed decrees
submitted by adverse counsel were filed in behalf of all
parties.
The foregoing is proof positive of the fact that all
concerned considered the October 14th ruling to be a mere
memorandum of decision.
The letters quoted above do not appear in the record
on appeal since plaintiffs had no idea that the defendants
would repudiate the procedure which they themselves
adopted. If any point is made of the fact that we have
thus exceeded the record, we request that this brief be
deemed a motion to augment the record on appeal by the
quoted correspondence. (Rule 75(h).)

5. CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 3, WHICH RELATES TO THE
SCOPE OF APPROPRIATE ACTION BY THIS COURT.

The manner in which Weber argues its Point 3 points
up the necessity for the Meaghers to urge this Court
to make it clear, when it writes its opinion, that certain
issues are not determined by the Interlocutory Decree.
Alternatively, if this Court considers that those issues
*Emphasis added.
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could and should have been determined by the Interlocutory Decree, the Meaghers request appropriate modification of the decree.
The issues to which we refer are (1) the ultimate
responsibility of We·ber, Stock and Juhan, and (2) the
status of Equity Oil Company.
The Meagher Opening Brief points out that the Interlocutory Decree acts only upon Equity. If it is deemed a
determination that the same relief cannot be afforded to
the Meaghers against Weber, Stock and Juhan, who are
Equity's admitted principals, then the Interlocutory Decree should be modified to correct such error. However
if this Court considers that the Interlocutory Decree
merely defers any award which will ultimately be made
against Weber, Stock and Juhan, then the Meaghers
respectfully ask this Court, when it renders its decision,
to make that interpretation clear, so that the Meaghers
will not be confronted with the contention that the failure
of the Interlocutory Decree to act upon \Veber, Stock and
Juhan precludes the lower court from doing so in further
proceedings.
The same applies to the status of Equity Oil Company. To prove that our apprehensions with respect to
this issue are ""'ell taken~ note the following statement
which appears on p. ~0 of Weber's Brief:
'· A<hnittedly the rulings of October 14, 1955, are
interlocutory as to Equity Oil Conlp,any in its status
of stakeholder and as to it there is no appeal until
a final judgtnent."
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This statement sounds like a concession that. the final
status of Equity Oil Company remains to be determined.
But the very next point of Weber's Brief argues that
the Interlocutory Decree does hold that the status of
Equity Oil Company is merely that of stakeholder.
In Weber's Brief the Meaghers were criticized for
pointing out, in their Appendices, items in the record
which prove Equity to be something more than a mere
stakeholder. We presume Weber refers to the uncontroverted evidence that Dougan agreed to finance the litigation
against Meagher as far back as 1945. We also presume
they refer to the several written declarations of trust
showing the joint association between all of the defendants in their efforts to oust the Meaghers. We also
presume they refer to the fact that Equity dealt with
the property .as an owner even after it had assigned all
of its interest therein to Weber.
But after criticizing the Meaghers for bringing this
Court's attention to these portions of the record, we find
this statement on p. 22 of Weber's Brief:
''Plaintiffs do not point to anything in the record
that would relieve them from the solemn pronouncement of the stakeholder status of Equity Oil Company."
If we understand this statement they mean that the
Interlocutory Decree holds that Equity is a stakeholder
and nothing else. The Meaghers do not agree with this
interpretation of the Interlocutory Decree. We consider
that the Interlocutory Decree merely holds that Equity
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.

Is surely a stakeholder and may be something more. If
we are in error in so interpreting the Interlocutory Decree, we ask this Court to modify the Interlocutory Decree
on this point and to hold, on the undisputed evidence
which is before it, that Equity is more than a stakeholder. On the other hand, if we are correct that the
Interlocutory Decree holds that Equity is a stakeholder
and also may be something more, we ask this Court to
make this point clear.
On p. 21 of Weber's Brief, in its reference to our
request that this Court make clear the meaning of the
Interlocutory Decree, either by modification or by interpretation, the Weber Brief unwittingly bares its true
philosophy of the function of this Court. They say ''we
submit that such is not the function of the appellate
court." In other words, in Weber's view, this Court
must hear the appeals with its head in the sand. It
knows that additional litigation is inevitable, but, according
to Weber, it must do nothing to assist and guide the
lower court. We do not agree with Weber that it is
beyond the function of this Court to clarify the issues,
instruct and guide the lo,Yer court and in all other respects facilitate the efficient adininistration of the case.

6.

CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 4, NAMELY, THE CONTENTION THAT ''THE INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND DECREE WAS AN IMPOSITION UPON THE TRIAL COURT.''

''T

''T

A. In discussing
eher ~s Point 4, the
eber Brief
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sumes to be a determination of disputed matters of fact.
What facts were disputed~ Weber specifies none. There
were none. Each fact recited in the Interlocutory Decree
is supported by documentary evidence which was before
Judge Tuckett and as to which no denial or dispute has
been offered. In making this statement we recognize that
it was necessary for Judge Tuckett to interpret the Dunford Decree and the decision of this Court affirming that
decree. If the Dunford Decree, as affirmed, does not
mean that the Meaghers own the former Stock Half in
the Sheridan Lease, then of course the legal premise upon
which the Interlocutory Decree is based is faulty. Elsewhere in this brief we answer the contentions of Weber
concerning the meaning of the Dunford Decree. But the
Interlocutory Decree involves no controverted fact.
For instance, paragraph numbered 1 of the decree,
immediately following the recitals, states that the Dunford
Decree adjudicated that the Meagher children own half
the lease as against Juhan and Stock. Then paragraph
numbered 2 of the Interlocutory Decree holds that the
Dunford Decree concludes and is binding upon Weber
so far as concerns any claim of Weber with respect to
the Meaghers' half interest in the lease. These legal conclusions contained in the Interlocutory Decree are disputed by Weber in this appeal. However, the mere fact
that Weber does not agree with Judge Tuckett's interpretation of the Dunford Decree does not mean that the
facts, upon which he based those legal conclusions, were
disputed.
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B. The Weber Brief says that the Meaghers ''complain of their own handiwork'' because the Interlocutory
Decree is in the form proposed by the Meaghers. The
answer to this is that the Meaghers understood the memorandum decision as being directed only to Equity Oil
Company. Accordingly, we prepared the Interlocutory
Decree in conformity therewith. We have previously
pointed out that if Judge Tuckett thereby intended to
eliminate Weber, Stock and Juhan as parties who are
responsible to account to the Meaghers for their operations, the Interlocutory Decree is in error and should be
modified. However, if Judge Tuckett merely intended to
defer determination of the responsibility of Weber, Stock
and Juhan, then no error has been committed. In any
event the Meaghers earnestly request this Court to state
the true interpretation of the Interlocutory Decree for the
lower court's guidance in the subsequent proceedings.
C. Weber complains that the Interlocutory Decree fails
to recognize 'Veber's rights under its motion for summary
judgment. We submit that this is not the case. The
Interlocutory Decree points out that the various assignments between the defendants are ineffective insofar as
they purport to involYe the for1ner Stock Half. But the
recitals also point out that these transfers of interest
between the defendants a.re valid against the ~I eaghers
so far as they relate only to the for1ner Phebus Half
interest. The conclusion required by these recitals is
stated in paragraph nwn·bered 3 of the Interlocutory
Decree which states that defendants Weber, Juhan and
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Stock own the remaining half interest in the lease as
against any and all adverse claims of the Meaghers. Thus
the Interlocutory Decree does recognize Weber's interest.
D. The Weber Brief on p. 23 states that the recitals
in the Interlocutory Decree depart from the findings of
the Supreme Court as stated in its opinion affirming the
Dunford Decree. Weber quotes a sentence from that
opinion which states that Juhan has transferred his interest to Equity and it to Weber, and also states that
neither Equity nor Weber were litigants in that action.
Then the Weber Brief points out that the Interlocutory
Decree in the instant action recites that Juhan assigned
portions of whatever interest he had to Paul Stock and
to Equity Oil Company.
Weber urges that this Court made a finding, which
modified the Dunford Decree to the effect that Juhan
assigned all of his interest to Equity and it to Weber. It
is then argued that the Interlocutory Decree is inconsistent in finding that a portion of Juhan's interest went
to Stock, or remained in Juhan.
The Meaghers believe that the sentence from the opinion
of this Court to which the Weber Brief refers was not
intended as an award to anyone but merely notes that
persons who were not parties to that action, namely,
Equity and Weber, may have interests in the lease. The
Meaghers do not believe that this Court intended by that
statement to deprive Juhan and Stock of the interests
which were awarded to them (out of the Phe'bus Half)
by the Dunford Decree. Furthermore, the ''all-for-one,
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one-for-all" agreement was not in the record when this
Court considered the Dunford Decree. But none of this
has any bearing on the Meaghers. If it were not for
the "one-for-all, all-for-one" agreement, defendants Juhan
and Stock would have been the aggrieved parties if this
Court on the former appeal had intended to hold that all
interests in the lease, excepting the half Meagher obtained
from Stock, were to be awarded to Weber or to Equity.
We do not think that such was the intention of this
Court. But even if it had been it would not affect the
Meaghers because there is no suggestion in the opinion
of this Court that the Meaghers did not receive the entire
former Stock Half. Therefore, any reference to what
Juhan may have done with respect to what remained must
necessarily relate to dealings with the former Phebus

Half.
Again we come to the only real question presented by
the Weber Brief, namely, did the Dunford Decree, as
affirmed by this Court, hold that the Meaghers obtained
the former Stock Half, or can it be "~arped into the
construction that all the Meaghers got from Stock was
half of the former Stock Half·? The mere statement of
this question contains its o"""D ans"~e.r. There has never
been any basis for the contention, and the contention has
never been asserted, tl1at Stork transferred less than all
he had to l\leagher. There hns neYer been any contention
that Stock owned less than n half "~hen he 1nade the transfer
to Meagher. rrherefore ~1eagher arquired one-half. There
has never bPen any contention that any of the defendants
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fore, even if the effect of the sentence from the opinion
of this Court, quoted on p. 23 of Weber's Brief, is to
divest Juhan of all interest and to transfer all of Juhan's
interest to Weber via Equity, it merely means that Juhan
and Stock are without any interest. It can have no bearing on the hard-fought and finally adjudicated fact that
the Meaghers obtained the Stock Half. Normally, this
entire line of argument could not be asserted by Weber
without creating conflict between it on the one hand and
Stock and Juhan on the other. However, the record in
the instant case discloses that each of the defendants is
free to assert extravagant claims in his own behalf even
if they conflict with claims of the other defendants.
They are free to do so simply because they have an
agreement that whatever any of them gets will inure
to the benefit of the others.

E. Section D under Point 4 of the Weber Brief asks
why the Interlocutory Decree runs only in favor of the
Meagher children and does not include the Senior
Meaghers.
N. J. Meagher, Sr. and his wife divested themselves

of all interests in the lease by quitclaim to their children
on January 27, 1948. They retained only a royalty interest which is not involved in this appeal. (Exhibit A-22
in District Court No. 2238.) This conveyance to the children
was made during the pendency of the quiet title litigation
and prior to the decision of Judge Dunford in the second
trial thereof. In fact, this transfer to the children was
made and recorded before any drilling operations were
conducted on the property.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
Having commenced the quiet title litigation in his own
name, since he was the owner of the property when the
complaint was filed in 1944, and having transferred the
property pending the litigation, the suit was carried on
in the name of N. J. !feagher, Sr. But it was made clear
in the record that he continued the litigation in his own
name in behalf of the true owners, his children. Defendants in the quiet title suit made quite a fuss over this
situation, but the issue was resolved in favor of the
Meaghers.
Having obtained a judgment for the benefit of the
children, but having been unable to collect the fruits
thereof from the defendants, the Senior Meaghers have
been confronted with the problem of how long they should
continue to act as trustees for their children. When the
instant case for an accounting was commenced, the
Meagher family "Tas advised that the Senior ~!eaghers
need not participate. Accordingly, the complaint, as filed
in the instant accounting suit, named only the four children as parties plaintiff. Thereafter during one of the
hearings before Judge Tuckett all defendants vociferously
insisted that the Senior 1\Ieaghers "Tere proper and necessary parties plaintiff. Plaintiffs considered this to be a
tempest in a teapot, but consented that the Senior
Meaghers be brought into the case if the defendants
wanted them to be parties. Accordingly~ it 'vas so ordered.
In viP'v of the insistPnr~ by the defendants that the
Senior Meaghers hP n1ade parties plaintiff, it is true that
the complaint no'v appears as though the Senior Meaghers
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asserted some rights in the premises as distinguished
from the rights of their children. Actually, such is not
the case, and, since the children are now the full and
beneficial owners of the interest Meagher Sr. acquired
from Stock, there is no reason for the defendants to
account to the Senior Meaghers or to make any payments
to them. When Mr. Meagher's deposition was taken, he
did say that he thought he personally was entitled to an
accounting in this action. Under the circumstances we
believe Mr. Meagher gave the correct answer in that, to
the extent he is a party to the action, and to the extent
he had been or still is a trustee for his children, he might
be entitled to an accounting. Actually, we see no reason
why the defendants should be required to make any payments to the Senior Meaghers or why they should be
required to give an accounting to them. The Interlocutory Decree does not require the defendants to account
or make payments to the Senior Meaghers, but requires
them to account and pay to the children.
We cannot understand why Weber seems insistent with
respect to this matter. Certainly, if they wish to make
an accounting to the Senior Meaghers, their documents
will be accepted, and if they wish to make any payments
to the Senior Meaghers, they will receive a receipt therefor. However, whatever dealings they may see fit to have
with the Senior Meaghers will be only for the account
and benefit of the children.
F. In this portion of Weber's Brief some point is
sought to be made based on the law that a quitclaim deed
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does not pass an after-acquired title. Certainly, if the
Senior Meaghers quitclaimed this property to their children in 1948 and acquired their only title thereto at some
later date, it is true that the quitclaim, per se, would pass
nothing. But the title which the Senior Meaghers obtained
from Stock was obtained by transfer in October, 1944, and
therefore any quitclaim executed by them in 1948 to the
same property would of course pass their title. The mere
fact that their title was not finally adjudicated until after
1948 has no bearing upon the fact that it was acquired
in 1944.

G. The Weber Brief then suggests the legal proposition that under an oil and gas lease the right of the
lessees may be a mere license to explore. The Meaghers
do not accept or reject this principle. We consider it
to be immaterial. Whatever the rights of a lessee may
be, the Meaghers, through Stock, acquired half of those
rights. The defendants, through Phebus, acquired the
other half. As to those rights, they were cotenants and
if some of them develop the property, their obligation
to account to the others is beyond dispute. Does Weber
argue that a cotenant of an oil lease can develop the
property to the exclusion of other co tenants? If so, we
have yet to see the decision so holding, and certainly none
is cited in Weber's Brief.
H. In Section E of Weber's Point 4, the following
state1nent appears:
''This begs the question because it has heretofore
been adjudicated and it is adn1itted in these proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceedings that Weber has the Phebus Half of the
Sheridan Lease.''
We have stated and reiterated that although we think
we know who owns the Phebus Half of the Sheridan
Lease, the Meaghers are not interested therein. If Weber
is the owner we invite counsel for Stock and Juhan to
admit it. The Meaghers merely state and have consistently stated that their title stems from the former Stock
Half and they own all of it.
I. In this section of the Weber Brief, with no apparent
relevancy, they urge the admitted fact that Equity Oil
Company openly and notoriously entered upon the prop·erty, drilled for and discovered oil. This is true. We
have asserted in the prior proceedings and repeat here
that .so long as any of the defendants had any interest
in this oil lease it was free to enter upon the property
openly and notoriously, .and it was free to drill and
produce oil therefrom. Then the Weber Brief repeats a
point strenuously urged in the prior proceedings, namely,
that the Meaghers did not protest this activity of Equity.
To this we answer that if the Meaghers had protested
it would have availed them nothing because one cotenant
can enter, drill and produce with or without the consent
of his cotenant, and no cotenant can prevent such action.*
Therefore any protest would have been a useless act. It
*Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen (C.C.A. 8th) 2 Fed. (2'd) 566 ·
Davis v. Byrd, 185 S.W.2d 866;
'
Allies Oil Co. v. Ayers, 152 La. 19, 92 So. 720;
Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R.I. 443, 96 Atl. 307.
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is also a fact, though equally immaterial, that none of
the defendants invited the Meaghers to participate in their
production operations. The reason for this is clear-they
had already determined to resist the claims of the
Meaghers and were, at that time, resisting them actively
in the quiet title suit.

7.

CONCERNING WEBER'S POINT 5, NAMELY, THAT "THE
FOURTH COUNT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AS AGAINST
ANY OF THE DEFENDANTS.''

The Weber Brief, in nine lines, argues that the Fourth
Count of plaintiffs' Complaint does not state a cause
of action because of its novelty and asserts that no legal
authority is cited. Weber ignores the theory of action
underlying plaintiffs' Fourth Count, namely, that a fiduciary who violates his trust must restore the beneficiaries'
loss, and secondly, that one may recover damages incurred
by reason of an intentional and wrongful interference
with his property by another. Wherein is such theory
of action novel~
In Meaghers' Opening Brief '"'e argued, citing judicial
decisions, that taxes are proper items to be taken into
account in determining dru11ages.
e recognize that none
of the eited eases constitutes binding authority in Utah,
but surely the decisions of other states are judicial authority worthy of consideration.

''T

The SuprenH? Court of ~faine~ in Sidelinker v. York
Shore Water Co. (1918) 117 Me. 52S, 108 Atl. 122 (cited
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in our Opening Brief), clearly supports our claim that
enhanced taxes resulting from the wrongful act of another
are recoverable as an item of damages. In that case
plaintiff owned valua1ble timber properties which he was
planning to log. Defendant improperly interfered with
his possession and, for several years, prevented the contemplated logging operations. The only item of damage
which plaintiff was allowed to recover was the enhanced
property taxes which he was compelled to pay during
the years his logging operations were interrupted by defendant's wrongful act. The court recognized that if
plaintiff had logged his property as planned, such operations would have resulted in reducing the value of the
property; consequently, the annual property taxes would
have been lower. Having been prevented from engaging
in the activities which would have reduced his annual
property taxes, plaintiff had been damaged. Therefore
the court held that defendant was required to reimburse
plaintiff in the amount of these enhanced taxes.

The Sidelinker case, supra, actually applied a broader
principle of law than is required in this case since no
fiduciary relationship was therein involved. As we
pointed out in our Opening Brief, this case does not
involve a question of whether all debtors failing to pay
their debts on time would be answerable to their creditors
for enhanced taxes. Weber appears to urge that this
is the contention of plaintiffs. We pointed out that
these parties are cotenants, and as ;.;uch stand in a
relationship of trust and confidence with reference to one
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another. It cannot be doubted that fiduciaries must
respond for damages caused by breach of trust.
The instant case may involve a difficult burden of
proof for the Meaghers. If they do not surmount it
the lower court will deny the claim. But this count is still'
at the pleading stage. The Meaghers merely ask the opportunity to prove their claim. They should not be deprived
of their day in court just because the issue presents difficult problems of proof.

8.

CONCLUSION.

The Weber Brief, when analyzed boils down to a single
contention. It seeks to interpret the Dunford Decree and
its affirmance as awarding to the Meaghers one-quarter
of the lease rather than one-half. If that is what the
Dunford Decree says and if that is what this Court
affirmed, Weber should prevail. The reasoning by which
the Weber Brief reaches its astonishing conclusion is so
confusing that we fear our efforts to analyze it may
augment that confusion. That, of course, is Weber's
only hope. Perhaps if one ean litigate long enough,
sooner or later son1e Judge or Court will fall into error
which can be capitalized.
Let us examine
have been raised
merit. Do they
W e'ber is bound

a fe"T of the points which surely would
by ''Teber if their position had any
attack Judge Tuckett's holding that
by the prior adjudication' They do
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not. They do not deny that Weber is a mere successor
in interest to and in privity with Stock and Juhan in
the quiet title litigation. Do they claim they are entitled
to any interest in the Stock Half of the lease obtained
by them before Meagher acquired it~ They do not. Do
they claim they are entitled to any interest in the Stock
: Half of the lease obtained by them as bona fide purchasers
: for value after Meagher acquired it~ They do not. Do
they claim they acquired any interest in the Stock Half
of the lease from the Meaghers ~ They do not. Those
are the only possible ways in which Weber could have
obtained any interest in the Stock Half of this lease. Not
one of those contentions has been asserted. Weber is
, relegated to the frivolous contention that when Judge
;·:· Dunford expressly awarded a one-half interest in the
~· lease to Meagher, he was only awarding a one-quarter
lJ interest.
They are forced to the contention that when
j this Court affirmed the Dunford Decree it did not know
( what it was doing. The Meaghers confidently rest their
~: case on the ability of this Court to construe the Dunford
i: Decree and its own opinion affirming it.
Dated: April27, 1956.
r·'

•'

Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT vAN DAM,
·GILBERT

·C. WHEAT,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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